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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 00-3189 
 
PENNSYLVANIA ASSOCIATION OF EDW ARDS HEIRS, a 
Pennsylvania non-profit corporation, 
 
       Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID PAUL RIGHTENOUR; HELEN RIGHTENOUR; 
DOUGLAS WAYNE EDWARDS; DUDLEY CAROL 
EDWARDS; ELEANOR LONGENECKER; BONNIE BLACK 
PARSONS; DON WUBE, individually d/b/a "Basic"; 
WACHOVIA BANK OF GEORGIA, successor in inter est to 
First National Bank of Atlanta, formerly the North Georgia 
Savings & Loan Association, formerly North Georgia Bank; 
WACHOVIA HOLDING CORP., a Geor gia Corporation; 
CAPITA RECOVERY SPECIALISTS; FIS VIDEO; FINANCIAL 
INVESTMENT SERVICES, INC.; DISCOUNT EXPRESS; 
MID-ATLANTIC PHONE ASSOCIATES; THE GRACE 
BAPTIST TABERNACLE; RIGHTENOUR & WEYANDT 
LUMBER COMPANY, INC.; YOUNG, OAKES BROWN CO., 
a professional corporation. 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 
District Court Judge: Donald E. Ziegler 
(D.C. Civ. No. 93-275 J) 
 
Argued October 24, 2000 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and FUENTES, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: December 14, 2000) 
 
 
  
       John P. Smarto (argued) 
       329 West Otterman Street 
       Greensburg, Pennsylvania 15601 
       Attorney for Appellant 
 
       Richard Wile (argued) 
       Wile & Norkus 
       2704 Gulf Tower 
       Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 
       Attorneys for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Pennsylvania Association of Edwards Heirs 
("the Association") appeals from a grant of summary 
judgment dismissing its complaint, which alleged that 
Wachovia Bank of Georgia ("W achovia Bank") aided and 
abetted in the commission of a RICO violation. In Rolo v. 
City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 
1998), we extended the Supreme Court's r easoning in 
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
511 U.S. 164 (1994), to RICO, and held that, because 
RICO's statutory text does not provide for a private cause of 
action for aiding and abetting and 18 U.S.C. S 2 cannot be 
used to imply this private right, no such cause of action 
exists under RICO. Appellant argues that our holding in 
Rolo leaves open the possibility that a civil aiding and 
abetting RICO claim could be recognized as a common law 
civil remedy. We disagree, and hold that Rolo's holding 
extends as well to common law-based RICO civil aiding and 
abetting claims. Therefore, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The Association is a non-profit corporation dedicated to 
pursuing a proper settlement of the ancient estate of a 
Welsh seaman, Robert Edwards, who allegedly owned a 
significant portion of lower Manhattan, including some 
areas in Wall Street, that never passed to his rightful heirs. 
This claim dates back to the initial Dutch and British 
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settlers who formed a colony in lower Manhattan, well 
before the nation's founding. The Association raised funds 
through membership contributions by 3,200 pr ospective 
heirs, who each paid $450 to buy an equal shar e of the 
professed $24 billion estate. The Association raised a large 
portion of its membership contributions between 1983 and 
1985 when former officers solicited alleged heirs. 
 
By the spring of 1988, the Association discover ed that 
some of its former officers had depleted all of the 
membership fees for unintended purposes. After electing 
new officers, the Association began an effort to trace and 
recoup the money. They discovered that the most 
significantly involved financial institution was the North 
Georgia Savings and Loan Association, a pr edecessor to 
Wachovia Bank, in which over $300,000 in membership 
fees had been deposited between 1984 and 1986. The 
Association contended that Wachovia Bank had aided and 
abetted the Association's former officers with 
misappropriating membership funds in violation of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. SS 1962(b), (c), and (d). Specifically, the 
Association claimed that Wachovia Bank had aided and 
abetted RICO predicate acts of mail and wir e fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 and 1343, and further 
conspired to commit money laundering and the laundering 
of monetary instruments contrary to 18 U.S.C. SS 1956 and 
1957. 
 
According to the Association, its vice-pr esident at the 
time, a local Baptist preacher named Douglas W ayne 
Edwards, had a close and personal relationship with the 
financial institution's president. The Association alleged 
that Edwards and the Association's treasur er, David Paul 
Rightenour, wrongly applied for, and received, personal 
loans from Wachovia Bank's predecessor by using as 
collateral certificates of deposit belonging to the 
Association. Allegedly, when Edwards and Rightenour 
defaulted on the loans, Wachovia Bank's pr edecessor 
improperly cashed the certificates and used the proceeds to 
satisfy any outstanding loan debt. In addition, the 
Association claimed that $50,000 of a cashed certificate, 
the proceeds of which were at least partly paid over to 
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Edwards, remained unaccounted. In sum, the Association 
alleged that Wachovia Bank allowed itself to be used as a 
conduit by aiding and abetting the fraudulent schemes of 
its former officers, resulting in the dissipation of nearly 
$1.5 million in membership contributions. 
 
After having unsuccessfully applied for summary 
judgment on timeliness grounds, Wachovia Bank filed a 
second summary judgment motion arguing that the 
Association's claim against it was barred because no private 
cause of action exists under RICO for aiding and abetting. 
This argument was based on a case we decided during the 
course of the litigation, Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating 
Trust, 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir . 1998), which extended the 
Supreme Court's reasoning in Central Bank of Denver v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 
In Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177, 191, the Supreme 
Court had ruled that private aiding and abetting suits were 
not authorized by S 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78j. In Rolo, 155 F .3d at 656-57, we 
applied similar reasoning in the RICO context, ruling that 
a private plaintiff could not maintain a claim of aiding and 
abetting an alleged RICO violation. The Association 
responded by relying upon Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks 
Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258 (3d Cir . 1995), which had been 
decided after Central Bank, but befor e Rolo, and dealt with 
a RICO aiding and abetting claim on the merits. The 
Association argued that a conflict exists in this circuit 
between Jaguar Cars and Rolo, which should be resolved by 
rejecting Rolo. 
 
In an order entered March 22, 1999, the District Court 
concluded that Rolo was controlling and granted summary 
judgment in favor of Wachovia Bank. The Court further 
opined that, to the extent a conflict existed, we would have 
to resolve it. 
 
II. 
 
Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary, 
and the record is judged by the same standard district 
courts use. Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 
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1999). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary 
judgment motions. Subsection 56(c) provides, in part, that: 
 
       [t]he judgment sought shall be render ed forthwith if the 
       pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
       admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
       show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
       fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
       as a matter of law. 
 
The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
summary judgment is to be entered if the evidence is such 
that a reasonable fact finder could find only for the moving 
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986); Doherty v. Teamsters Pension T rust Fund, 16 F.3d 
1386, 1389 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
Prior to Central Bank, private aiding and abetting claims 
relating to S 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act were 
widely thought to be legitimate. 
 
        In hundreds of judicial and administrative 
       proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system, the 
       courts and the SEC have concluded that aiders and 
       abettors are subject to liability under S 10(b) . . . . 
       While we have reserved decision on the legitimacy of 
       the theory in two cases that did not present it, all 11 
       Courts of Appeals to have considered the question have 
       recognized a private cause of action against aiders and 
       abettors under S 10(b) . . . . 
 
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
However, the Supreme Court dramatically altered the 
landscape with its decision in Central Bank, wherein the 
majority ruled that, "[b]ecause the text ofS 10(b) does not 
prohibit aiding and abetting, we hold that a private plaintiff 
may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under 
S 10(b)." Id. 
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As the Supreme Court recognized, the judiciary had 
previously determined that private S 10(b) enforcement 
actions had been impliedly authorized from the statutory 
language. See id. at 171. Beyond that, however, the Court 
emphasized that "[w]ith respect . . . to. . . the scope of 
conduct prohibited by S 10(b), the text of the statute 
controls our decision. . . . We have r efused to allow [S 10(b)] 
challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the 
statute." Id. at 173. Thus, the Supr eme Court directed that 
"the statutory text controls the definition of conduct 
covered by S 10(b)." Id. at 175. Applying this paradigm, the 
Court wrote: 
 
        Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting 
       liability when it chose to do so. If . . . Congr ess 
       intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we 
       presume it would have used the words "aid" and "abet" 
       in the statutory text. But it did not. 
 
        We reach the uncontroversial conclusion, accepted 
       even by those courts recognizing a S 10(b) aiding and 
       abetting cause of action, that the text of the 1934 Act 
       does not itself reach those who aid and abet aS 10(b) 
       violation. Unlike those courts, however, we think that 
       conclusion resolves the case. It is inconsistent with 
       settled methodology in S 10(b) cases to extend liability 
       beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the 
       statutory text. To be sure, aiding and abetting a 
       wrongdoer ought to be actionable in certain instances. 
       The issue, however, is not whether imposing private 
       civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but 
       whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute. 
 
        . . . . The [S 10(b)] proscription does not include 
       giving aid to a person who commits a manipulative or 
       deceptive act. We cannot amend the statute to create 
       liability for acts that are not themselves manipulative 
       or deceptive within the meaning of the statute. 
 
Id. at 177-78 (citations omitted). In r eaching this holding, 
the majority also addressed and discounted numerous 
arguments, including policy considerations, that would 
have supported a civil aiding and abetting claim r elevant to 
S 10(b). See id. at 175-91. 
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B. 
 
Several years later, in Rolo v. City Investing Co. 
Liquidating Trust, we affirmed the dismissal of a private 
plaintiff 's RICO aiding and abetting claim because we were 
"convinced that a private cause of action for aiding and 
abetting a RICO violation cannot survive the Supr eme 
Court's decision in [Central Bank]." Rolo, 155 F.3d at 656. 
After briefly reviewing Central Bank's reasoning, we 
concluded "that the same analysis controls our 
construction of the civil RICO provision." Id. at 657. 
 
       Like S 10(b), the text of [RICO] S 1962 itself contains no 
       indication that Congress intended to impose private 
       civil aiding and abetting liability under RICO. . . . 
 
        . . . [D]espite the existence of cogent policy 
       arguments in support of extending civil liability to 
       aiders and abettors of RICO violations, under [ Central 
       Bank], we must "interpret and apply the law as 
       Congress has written it, and not [ ] imply private 
       causes of action merely to effectuate the purported 
       purposes of the statute." Because the text of the RICO 
       statute does not encompass a private cause of action 
       for aiding and abetting a RICO violation, "in 
       accordance with the policies articulated in Central 
       Bank of Denver", we have no authority to imply one. 
       On this basis, we will affirm the district court's 
       dismissal of the RICO claims . . . . 
 
Id. (citations omitted). We find this reasoning as fully 
persuasive today as when we decided Rolo, and therefore, 
reject the Association's argument. 
 
In arguing for a different r esult, the Association sets forth 
three arguments, all of which we find unpersuasive. First, 
the Association submits that Central Bank's reasoning is 
limited to the Securities Exchange Act. However , nothing in 
Central Bank indicates that its reasoning is specific to the 
particular statute presented in that case. Rather, the 
majority's reasoning concerning when a private claim for 
aiding and abetting is available, which hinges on an 
analysis of statutory language, is equally applicable to 
RICO as well. 
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Second, the Association opines that Rolo is not 
dispositive because it is in conflict with Jaguar Cars, an 
earlier but post-Central Bank decision, that: (1) reiterated 
that aiding and abetting liability may be available under 
RICO, and (2) assessed that issue on the merits. See 
Jaguar Cars, 46 F.3d at 270. This ar gument lacks merit. As 
the Rolo panel persuasively explained, no conflict really 
exists. In justifying its holding that, after Central Bank, 
aiding and abetting liability under RICO was no longer 
available, the Rolo court wrote: 
 
        [w]e reach this result despite our discussion of aiding 
       and abetting liability in Jaguar Cars, a case decided 
       after [Central Bank]. See 46 F .3d at 270. In Jaguar 
       Cars, the opinion did not address the impact of [Central 
       Bank] on earlier cases that had recognized a private 
       cause of action for aiding and abetting under RICO . The 
       decision in Jaguar Cars focused on whether there had 
       been sufficient evidence to find the defendant liable for 
       aiding and abetting a RICO violation. See 46 F.3d at 
       270. The parties did not challenge the existence of a 
       cause of action for aiding and abetting, and we did not 
       raise the issue sua sponte. Although, under this 
       Court's Internal Operating Procedur es, we are bound 
       by, and lack the authority to overrule, a published 
       decision by a prior panel, see I.O.P . 9.1, we conclude 
       that the discussion of a private cause of action for 
       aiding and abetting a RICO violation in Jaguar Cars 
       does not control our analysis in this case. The decision 
       in [Central Bank] was not called to the attention of the 
       panel in Jaguar Cars, and the panel's opinion neither 
       explicitly nor implicitly decided the impact of[Central 
       Bank] on the continued availability of a private cause of 
       action for aiding and abetting a RICO violation. 
 
Rolo, 155 F.3d at 657 (emphasis added). This reasoning is 
consistent with long established stare decisis principles. 
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 
(1821). 
 
Finally, the Association argues that: (1) co mmon law civil 
principles require that a private aiding and abetting claim 
be recognized under RICO, and (2) various pol icy 
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arguments favor recognizing a private aiding and abetting 
RICO claim. We reject each of these contentions. 
 
As to the former, acceptance of the Association's common 
law argument would fundamentally under mine the 
constrained approach to aiding and abetting liability that 
the Supreme Court set forth in Central Bank  and which we 
subsequently followed in Rolo. Moreover , the common law 
perspective is significantly undermined, if not totally 
discredited, by the Supreme Court's discussion in Central 
Bank regarding the history of aiding and abetting liability. 
 
        Aiding and abetting is an ancient criminal law 
       doctrine. Though there is no federal common law of 
       crimes, Congress in 1909 enacted what is now 18 
       U.S.C. S 2, a general aiding and abetting statute 
       applicable to all federal criminal offenses. The statute 
       decrees that those who provide knowing aid to persons 
       committing federal crimes, with the intent to facilitate 
       the crime, are themselves committing a crime. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        . . . Congress has not enacted a general civil aiding 
       and abetting statute--either for suits by the 
       Government (when the Government sues for civil 
       penalties or injunctive relief) or for suits by private 
       parties. Thus, when Congress enacts a statute under 
       which a person may sue and recover damages fr om a 
       private defendant for the defendant's violation of some 
       statutory norm, there is no general presumption that 
       the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors. 
 
        Congress instead has taken a statute-by-statute 
       approach to civil aiding and abetting liability. 
 
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 181-82 (emphasis added and 
citations omitted). The Supreme Court's language makes it 
abundantly clear that, in the absence of statutory 
authorization, there is no presumption in favor of 
recognizing a civil aiding and abetting claim. Therefore, we 
must reject the Association's argument that, under 
common law principles, a civil aiding and abetting claim 
must be recognized with respect to RICO. 
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With regard to the policy ar guments, Central Bank 
instructs that they are of no avail to the Association unless 
an unacceptably aberrant result would entail."Policy 
considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text 
and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may 
help to show that adherence to the text and structure 
would lead to a result `so bizarre' that Congress could not 
have intended it." Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188 (quoting 
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)). The 
Association is unable to identify any such "bizarre" 
consequences of any merit. Thus, the controlling issue "is 
not whether imposing private civil liability on aiders and 
abettors is good policy but whether aiding and abetting is 
covered by the statute." Central Bank , 511 U.S. at 177. In 
Rolo, we answered that inquiry in the negative with respect 
to the RICO statute. We accordingly adhere to our prior 
decision. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons explained above, we will affirm the 
District Court's order. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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